Comparative Law and Social Theory, by Jerome Hall by Hazard, John N.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 8
Winter 1964
Comparative Law and Social Theory, by Jerome
Hall
John N. Hazard
Columbia University
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hazard, John N. (1964) "Comparative Law and Social Theory, by Jerome Hall," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 39: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol39/iss2/8
BOOK REVIEWS
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL TIEORY. By Jerome Hall. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1963. Pp. vi, 167. $5.00.
Rejection of the concept of comparative law as method and espousal
of a goal of humanistic legal sociology provide the thesis of Jerome Hall's
important book. He writes at a time when comparatists the world around
are searching for purpose. None of them can ignore this thoughtful ef-
fort to restate goals. But not only has Hall written for comparatists.
His thesis would bring the comparative study of law back into the stream
of social science as an important dimension. For this reason he ends his
book with a chapter berating the behaviorists for abandoning law as an
element of their study in reaction to the formalism of the nineteenth
century.
At the risk of oversimplification of a closely reasoned book of
learned dimension, the thesis is this: Gutteridge of Cambridge oriented
comparative law research on method, saying that comparative law was
not a branch of law but a method of study and research.' Hamson and
David as his most noted students have spread this approach around the
world.2 The appeal of this group has been so great as to overshadow, or
nearly so, those comparatists such as Rheinstein and Yntema who find
comparative law to be synonymous with sociology of law or legal sci-
ence.8 Hall has suggested that he is with the sociological group, but not
entirely. He asks why comparative law should be utilized as a term if it
is but another name for legal science or legal sociology. He would in-
novate for comparative law and use the term to apply to something
between method, as Gutteridge would have desired, and sociology of law
(legal science).
Developing his position, Hall establishes a preliminary thesis that
comparative law is a halfway house, an intermediate point "between the
knowledge of particular laws and legal institutions, on the one side, and
the universal knowledge of them at the other extreme."4  The latter is
scientific legal sociology of legal science. Hall would stop short of that
1. GUTTERIGE, COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1949), cited pp. 7-8. . .
2. HAm.sox, THE LAW: ITS STUDY AND COMPARISON (1955), cited pp. 7-10.
D.WID, TRAITE ELFMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIvM COMPARE (1950), cited pp. 7-10.
3. Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law, 1 Am. J. ComP. L. 98 (1952),
cited pp. 11-12. Yntema, Comparative Legal Research, 54' MicE. L. REv. 899 (1956),
cited p. 12.
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extreme at a stage in the search for broad universal generalizations, and
that stage he would call "'humanistic legal sociology.' "
To accept his goal, Hall declares that there cannot be a reduction of
currently available knowledge to a set of common terms which would be
systematized, but humanistic legal sociology should strive to create a
single rationale and compatability in relation of these types of knowledge
to a common subject matter, the positive law.6
In Hall's view research was based on a wrong premise when it was
initiated in 1900.' This was the belief that every society must pass
through stages of evolution, from which all would emerge at some com-
mon point. The movement for unification that grew from this premise
has now been criticized as utopian, although Marc Ancel has sought to
salvage something by arguing for at least a common language, a common
meeting ground, an increased understanding of the common good, if a
new ius gentium is out of the question.8
Comparatists have also erred because they search for common con-
cepts, but few appreciate that what people accept as the concept of law
depends upon the philosophy they hold, and personal preference governs
choice. There is no common definition of law, and comparatists must,
therefore, content themselves with construction of a concept of law which
is not definitive but which has the more limited aim of facilitating the
acquisition of social knowledge of law. Neither the ordinary, nor the
positivist concepts of law suffice for that purpose. Comparatists must,
however, work with positive law, i.e., with authoritative materials like
statutes and judicial decisions, and they must also work with the sociology
of law as knowledge of the positive law. But they must limit themselves
to high level abstraction based upon not more than a few legal systems;
they should not continue to search for universalism-for the ultimate
jurisprudential notion, the concept of law.
With this relatively limited vision of comparative law as a discipline,
not a method, and concerned with generalizing from several but not all
legal systems, and avoiding the ultimate abstractions of jurisprudence
(in the common law sense), Hall attacks details. Humanistic legal so-
ciology, as he chooses to call his discipline, must work with facts, but not
only in the form of statutes, judicial decisions and issuances from the
sovereign. It must examine the laws of sub-groups, that is, law as con-
4. P. 33.
5. P. 42.
6. P. 43.
7. Pp. 44-45.
8. Ancel, La doctrine todversaliste dant l'oeuvre de Levy- Ullmann, 1948 L'0euvre
juridique de Levy-Ullmann 181, 195, 201, cited pp. 44-46.
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duct or what happens in society. This involves study of the fact of feel-
ing and tendencies to act, and since conduct is not always preceded by
thought, but is spontaneous, the starting point for the comparatist must
be action, rather than thinking. To this reader Hall is here making a
plea for behavioristic studies. He is thinking of customary law as being
social reality.
Hall expects to be challenged. He says it is not easy to break away
from the tradition that positive law is a rule or concept, for this has been
hardly challenged from Plato to modern times, but for him the social
reality of law is not solely the norms but the whole conduct which in-
cludes and expresses those norms. One must place legal norms, there-
fore, in the social context, and this means not merely the immediate sur-
roundings that all can see, but everything that law as conduct has pro-
duced and everything that has influenced and determined that conduct.
This calls for a coalescence of legal ideas, values and facts.'
How can such multi-sided research be conducted? At this point Hall
makes his argument that norms be the core. He notes agreement in so-
ciology, anthropology and comparative politics that the components of
social structure are norms, status and role." "Norms render social ac-
tions intelligible, and supply the basis for expectations regarding the con-
duct of persons in a known culture."" He speaks not only of legal norms
but also of the non-legal norms. He proposes that the norms of various
societies be compared against models or types, as suggested by Max
Weber's ideal types,'2 and if this is done, he expects to find legal systems
ranged in a series between polar extremes. No current systems are ade-
quate, and he explores some of them, notably those based on "adherence
to rule of law" or "ideology."' 3 The problem confronting comparatists
becomes, therefore, how to improve current typologies and how to adapt
them to needs of socio-legal research.
As an example, Hall notes that one cannot meaningfully compare the
English judiciary with the Soviet judiciary where judges are expected to
implement the party's program because they are instruments in quite dif-
ferent cultures.' 4 He admits that in some cases there will be incompara-
bility, and so he suggests limitation in comparative study to carefully
selected segments of a legal system, and rejection of comparison of entire
legal systems in broad scope. There may also be comparison on the basis
9. Pp. 81, 88.
10. P. 90.
11. Ibid.
12. WEBER, THE rMETHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (1949), cited pp. 98-99.
13. P. 101.
14. Ibid.
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of function, although this method has recently been called into question
by the sociologists. There may be utilization of solutions to common
problems in different systems. From this could emerge a body of knowl-
edge which "would make present comparative disciplines branches of a
well-established humanistic sociology of law."' 5
If this book has been read aright, and a reviewer may well tremble
in approaching such a volume to which years of thought and erudition
have contributed, it is telling comparatists just what they must do with
the "method" popularized by Gutteridge, rather than leaving them, as
Gutteridge is said to do, to utilize the method for whatever purpose they
wish. Hall would have comparatists bring to social scientists insight on
human behavior gained from the study of norms so that we may all
understand more fully what mankind is doing. As in research in pure
science, as opposed to applied science, this would not be done with any
purpose in mind. Hall decries purposeful research, that is, research de-
signed solely to meet a specific problem of the legal draftsman, although
he makes the assumption of scientists that, if pure science is conducted,
it will not be without its ultimate reward.
This is all very well, although as one who knew Gutteridge I am not
sure that he has not been set up as a straw man to make a point. He was
thoroughly English and, consequently, oriented on facts, but he would
not have been adverse to use of the comparative method to study social
behavior, nor are Hamson and David. Gutteridge was plagued by un-
informed individuals who thought that comparative law was another dis-
cipline like contracts, torts or criminal law, and they wanted to know
what it was. He was meeting their question by saying that he only ad-
vocated a method by which they could work toward a common commercial
law for much of the world, a goal which was dear to his heart. He can
be read only in the light of his times, which Hall correctly defines as
those of expectation that world-wide unification of law, at least of com-
mercial law, was sure to ensue if the statutes and judicial decisions were
examined, compared and made the basis of round tables designed to find
the reasons for the differences and then, perhaps, a compromise which
would satisfy the parties present.
The American comparatists have sought to avoid the problem of
questions as to what is comparative law by speaking of the "comparative
study of law," and most of them, as Hall indicates, have utilized com-
parative study for the purpose of understanding the role of law in so-
ciety.'6 Some have met very concrete problems by comparative research
15. P. 110.
16. Pp. 113-16.
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as to what is desirable and practicable in social legislation, using the ex-
perience of Germany and Scandinavia for the study. Some have utilized
the method to help American lawyers communicate with a minimum of
misunderstanding with corresponding lawyers practicing in other legal
systems. But generally, Rheinstein andYntema have set the pace, which
is to utilize the comparative method to understand societies.
Generally also American research has been in limited areas, perhaps
for the reason that Hall suggests, namely, that the knowledge of its par-
ticipants has been limited. Few have tried to generalize on the basis of all
systems because Americans tend not to attempt to be encyclopedic in their
knowledge or to make sweeping generalizations. But this is not to say
that an encyclopedist, if one there be, could not be more stimulating if
he attempted generalizations on the broad basis that his knowledge makes
possible.
If a quarrel is to be picked, it is with the stricture against attempt-
ing to compare all of one legal system with all of another. Hall says "the
assumption that the whole of any nation's laws, or even of a branch of
that law, can in its totality be made the basis of comparative study clouds
the problem of comparability."' 7 In my own experience I have thought
it fruitful to confront American students with the contrast offered by
enough of the whole of the Soviet system and enough of the whole of the
American system to show how the law of a community-oriented society
compares with the law of an individually-oriented society. If anything
less than the whole is taken for comparison, the systems look poles apart
at some points and close together at others, depending upon the segment
or branch of the law that is compared. It is only when the whole sweep
of one system of social control is compared with the whole sweep of the
other, and in utilization not only of statutes, judicial decisions and other
materials emanating from the sovereign, but in consideration also of non-
legal controls as Hall advocates," that the highly complicated pattern of
contrast is disclosed. Then it is that one sees the interplay of ideas upon
patterns of social control emerging in societies in process of subjection to
the imperatives of industrialization. Some features begin to look com-
mon to both systems, but others represent tenaciously held positions stem-
ming from beliefs founded upon "ideologies," each of which has been
constructed by men trying to find a means of satisfying mankind's crav-
ing for recognition of human dignity, in the confines of an industrial
society.
Enough has been said to show that comparatists owe a debt of grati-
17. P. 94.
18. P. 90.
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tude to Professor Hall for the review he has made of what has been done
to date and for his proposals as to what should be the goal for comparat-
ists in the future. We can share with him his final admonition that a
scholar's work increases as he comes more fully to understand his role in
a large enterprise of importance, although the creative tasks of scholar-
ship remain individual ones. 9 If the individual can come to believe that
his attention to detail is but a part of an effort of multitudes to under-
stand the behavior of mankind, and thereby to provide in some presently
unforeseeable way for man's triumph over forces of destruction, he will
face his inevitable moments of exhaustion and discouragement with com-
posure, or what the public used to call, "philosophically."
jOEN N. HAZARDt
MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT. By George E. Palmer. Co-
lumbus: Ohio State University Press. 1962. Pp. 114. $3.75.
One should not expect this book to be a best seller. Except for what
I think is a modernistic jacket design, Mistake and Uqust Enrichment is
a decidedly old-fashioned book. Nothing has happened in recent years
to cause any new anxiety about the subject matter; interdisciplinary sig-
nificance is lacking; and the author has not availed himself of symbolic
logic or electro-magnetic assistance. Instead, he has done the rather
tedious job of analyzing, synthesizing and criticizing appellate case ma-
terial in a private law area distinguished by a long history of classificatory
chaos.
The mess which one finds in the general area of Restitution has been
documented by others. In his Restitution casebook, Dean Wade reports
that the General Digest user is without a "rubric" and must consult over
25 key numbers to get at the relevant cases.' But there is some hope ac-
cording to two authors who, in remarkably similar passages, suggest that
something or someone is beginning to bring order out of chaos.2 Cer-
19. P. 124.
t Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
1. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION 37 (1958).
2. "The remedies aimed at restitution of unjust enrichment have grown like Topsy.
They could be better described as a diversified litter of Topsies, with a common par-
entage that was only recently discovered." Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Onio
ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
"The subject of Restitution never really grew or developed. Rather, it has been
like dim fragments moving amongst the bright stars of the curricular firmament,
sweeping up cosmic dust and the shattered pieces of other bodies as they disintegrated,
